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Abstract 
The role of informal networks in the development of regional clusters has received a lot of 
attention in the literature recently. Informal contact between employees in different firms is 
argued to be one of the main carriers of knowledge between firms in a cluster. This paper 
empirically examines the role of informal contacts in a specific cluster. In a recent questionnaire, 
we ask a sample of engineers in a regional cluster of wireless communication firms in Northern 
Denmark, a series of questions on informal networks. We analyze whether the engineers actually 
acquire valuable knowledge through these networks. We find that the engineers do share even 
valuable knowledge with informal contacts. This shows that informal contacts are important 
channels of knowledge diffusion. 
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1  Introduction 
Many researchers have provided detailed studies of clusters with high performing innova-
tive capabilities within the last ten years or so. Often clusters have been closely connected to 
leading edge universities in the business area of the cluster. Literature on Marshallian indus-
trial districts (Brusco, 1990; Pyke et al., 1990; Russo, 1985) have argued that one of the expla-
nations for the concentration of innovative activities has been that knowledge, developed in a 
cluster or industrial district, flows more easily within it, but slowly outside and across its 
borders. One of the proposed reasons is that informal networks of contacts emerge between 
individuals across firm boundaries acting as channels of knowledge flows. These channels of 
communication are argued to facilitate knowledge diffusion, giving firms located in clusters 
advantages regarding innovative performance. Numerous studies have highlighted the im-
portance of these channels for the existence of clusters, with Saxenian (1994) as one of the 
most cited examples. Similarly, authors of econometric studies of the geography of innova-
tion (many of which are reviewed by Feldman (1999)) have unanimously claimed that local-
ized knowledge spillovers (LKS) of this kind are the main reason why innovative activity is 
geographically clustered.  
Knowledge spillovers through informal contacts are just one of the externalities that are 
argued to be the main forces behind industrial clustering. From the classical work of Alfred 
Marshall (1890), Krugman (1991) derives three kinds of externalities that are important for 
clustering: (i) economies of specialization caused by a concentration of firms being able to 
attract and support specialized suppliers, (ii) economies of labor pooling, where the existence 
of a labor force with particular knowledge and skills attracts firms, which in turn attract and 
create more specialized labor, and (iii) technological externalities or knowledge spillovers 
(LKS), where knowledge and information flows more easily between actors located in a clus-
ter than over long distance. 
In his effort to integrate the geographical dimension into mainstream economic theory, 
Krugman (1991) dismissed the role of LKS by claiming that although they may exist in some 
high-tech industries, they are not an important force for agglomeration. Instead focus should 
be directed towards more measurable externalities such as economies of specialization and 
labor pooling. Krugman’s claim has fueled an intense and sometimes hostile discussion with 
the community of economic and industrial geographers (see Martin and Sunley (1996) and 
Martin (1999) for examples of this debate) and other scholars as evidenced by the critical 
quotes in Jaffe et al. (1993) and Audretsch and Feldman (1996). In the quest to dismiss Krug-
man on this point, Martin (1999) claims that empirical studies of the geography of innovation 
provide clear evidence that LKS plays an important role in clustering of economic activity. 
However these studies have been criticized by Breschi and Lissoni (2001a), who argue that 
the concept of LKS is no more than a ‘black-box’ with ambiguous contents. In particular they 
argue that this literature neglects to distinguish between local knowledge flows that take the 
nature of public goods and those that do not. T h e y  s u g g e s t  t h a t  s t u d y i n g  i n  d e t a i l  h o w    3
knowledge actually is transferred between individuals and firms located in the same geo-
graphical area is necessary to shed some light on this issue. 
In the next section of the paper we present a review of the theoretical ideas that have been 
dominant in the debate on the role of informal knowledge exchange through personal con-
tacts. Indeed we see informal knowledge exchange as an example of a channel of knowledge 
spillovers or Marshallian technological externalities. Consequently, we look only at the con-
tributions that have looked at this as an isolated empirical and theoretical phenomenon. We 
argue that these theories possibly have contributed to the creation of the myth that clusters 
are driven by intense disclosure of detailed knowledge between firms. This myth has spread 
to the above mentioned literature on clusters and the geography of innovation. We confront 
the dominant theories with an alternative view, which has criticized the proposed role of in-
formal contacts in clusters by arguing that they are used to disclose only very general infor-
mation and ideas of minor importance, which is not an important explanation for clustering 
of economic and innovative activity. 
To study the importance and extent of informal networks in clusters, we draw on a recent 
questionnaire study of the communications cluster in Northern Denmark (NorCOM). The 
discovery of NorCOM by Gelsing and Brændgaard (1988) relied on the same arguments for 
the existence of this cluster. They argued that informal personal networks are intensive be-
tween the employees, who carry knowledge through the cluster. Later, Dalum (1993) stated 
that the employees are highly related at the personal level and that there are many relations 
of a cooperative as well as a competitive nature. This helped the establishment of the domi-
nant local view that the informal networks within the cluster were one of the main reasons 
for its fast growth in the 1990s. 
This paper examines informal networks of contacts between employees in NorCOM and 
assesses whether these networks act as important channels of valuable and specific knowl-
edge exchange between firms. Furthermore, we investigate the genesis of the informal con-
tacts by studying relationships, experience and other factors influencing their extent. Unlike 
previous studies of NorCOM, this analysis is carried out at the level of the individual em-
ployee, in this case the engineer, in order to give a more complete picture of the informal 
network of contacts. Previous studies have been based on interviews with the managers of 
the firms, and we believe that such studies cannot completely reveal the extent and impor-
tance of networks.1 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents theories of 
the importance of knowledge diffusion through informal contacts in general and in clusters 
specifically. Section three builds testable propositions from the theoretical framework and 
describes the NorCOM Questionnaire Survey on which out analysis is based. The historical 
development and a review of the existing studies of our empirical case in terms of inter-firm 
relations are presented in section four. The results are presented in section five. Finally, the 
conclusions are presented in the last section. 
                                                           
1 Skarsø (1998) also uses the engineers as the unit of analysis, but does not deal with their relationship with engineers 
in other firms.   4
2  Knowledge Diffusion and Informal Contacts 
The ideas of collective invention (Allen, 1983) are convenient for describing the dynamics 
of knowledge diffusion through networks and clusters. Collective invention is characterized 
by positive feedbacks of high invention rates and fast knowledge accumulation created by 
disclosure of information between competing agents. Collective invention is driven by ex-
change and circulation of knowledge and information within networks formed by groups of 
socially connected individuals. 
Allen’s ideas were based on case studies of the blast furnace industry in Cleveland (UK) in 
the middle of the 19th century, where producers shared knowledge about their furnaces, ena-
bling them collectively to discover the positive relationship between productivity and the 
height of the furnace (Allen, 1983). Since then, other historical case studies have confirmed 
the ideas of Allen, for instance McGaw’s (1987) study of the mechanization of paper manu-
facture in the Berkshire area (New England) from the beginning of the 19th century. Another 
example is Lamoreaux and Sokoloff’s (2000) study of the American glass industry from the 
1870-1925. These cases seem to be geographically bounded and thus relevant for general clus-
ter theory. More recent developments of regional clusters, such as Silicon Valley, where rapid 
technological development is combined with a relatively open diffusion of knowledge 
(Saxenian, 1994), and the Italian industrial districts provide modern examples of collective 
invention (Russo, 1985). 
Two particular aspects are worth noting about collective invention (Cowan and Jonard, 
2000). First, participation in such communities requires a high level of technical knowledge 
and skill, which is needed to contribute to, and to take advantage of, developments within 
the communities. Second, reputation effects are very important, because the provision of in-
formation is motivated primarily by an expectation of reciprocity. 
Although the idea of collective invention is appealing, it is primarily relevant to industries 
where firms do not spend substantial amounts on development of new knowledge. In these 
cases it is profitable to release technical information and knowledge, since it is expensive and 
nearly impossible to exclude others from the developments (Allen, 1983). 
When similar firms are located in clusters (or industrial district-like environments), firms 
share a common set of values and knowledge so important that they form a cultural envi-
ronment. In this environment, firms are linked together by specific informal relations in a 
complex mix of cooperation and competition (Brusco, 1990). In Saxenian’s (1994) comparison 
of the regional agglomerations in Silicon Valley and Route 128, disparity emerges in the crea-
tion and character of networks. In Silicon Valley, informal contact between individuals is im-
portant, mutually beneficial, and widely observed. With a culture supporting informal 
relationships and a variety of regional institutions providing network services by arranging 
trade fairs, conferences, seminars, and social activities, the individuals (co-workers, competi-
tors, former co-workers, suppliers, customers etc.) keep meeting each other, resulting in the 
formation of relationships and informal contacts. These are maintained and strengthened by 
ongoing activities. Technical and market information is exchanged, because the Silicon Valley 
culture lets them discuss details about their work. In the Route 128 case, informal contacts   5
were few and the culture discouraged networking, exchange of knowledge and problems. 
The extent of informal activity in Silicon Valley is perhaps unusual, but the level of interac-
tion and information flow is important for the evolution of clusters in general. Enright (2001) 
uses the term latent clusters to describe clusters without a sufficient level of interaction and 
information flows. 
The existing literature (e.g. Rogers, 1982; Von Hippel, 1987; Schrader, 1991) suggests that 
knowledge diffusion through informal channels happens as information trading. This type of 
informal exchange of knowledge between firms is a frequently observed phenomenon in 
product development, production and diffusion of technological innovations (see Martilla, 
1971; Allen, 1984; Czepiel, 1974). Information trading refers to informal exchange of informa-
tion between employees working for different and sometimes competing firms (Von Hippel, 
1987). Colleagues in different firms provide each other with technical advice, expecting that 
their favors will be returned in the future. For instance, an employee in the production proc-
ess might solve unforeseen technical problems by communicating with a colleague in a com-
peting firm using the same production equipment. The colleague in the other firm has to de-
cide whether to provide him with the information. If it creates disadvantages for his firm, he 
might want to keep it. Otherwise, he would disclose it with a future favor in mind (Schrader, 
1991). 
The transfer of knowledge represents a potential cost for the transferring firm. Competitive 
advantage decreases to an extent that depends on the value of the knowledge (Allen, 1984). 
In other words, the transfer of knowledge influences the firm’s valuation of this particular 
piece of information. Schrader (1991) points to three factors influencing these expectations. 
First, the rents that the firm can expect to gain from a given piece of information are influ-
enced by the degree of competition. If the firm transfers to a non-competing firm the change 
in rents are likely to be zero, unless the other firm transfers this information to another com-
peting firm. Also, if the two firms have different competitive goals, the receiving firm might 
get the benefits without the transferring firm losing rents (see also Hamel et al., 1989). Sec-
ond, the availability of alternative information sources has an effect on rent expectations, 
which depends on the time span for which the owner has an advantage relative to the in-
quirer of the information. Similar knowledge and information can often be acquired from 
other sources, e.g. suppliers or competitors. Consequently, the competitive advantage of a 
piece of information can be lost even if the transferring firm refuses to transfer to the receiver. 
Third, the rents are affected by whether the information relates to a domain in which the two 
firms compete. Firms are likely to compete along many dimensions, e.g. price, quality and 
consumer services. The decrease in rent expectations differ between these. 
On the other hand, firms might also have rent benefits from transmitting information or 
knowledge. Studies by Von Hippel (1987) and Rogers (1982) show that the transfer of knowl-
edge is part of a relationship based on mutual exchange. Schrader (1991) points to two differ-
ent approaches. The first assumes that the partners are interested in continuing the relation-
ship. A firm would weaken the relationship if it does not return the favor, which will keep it 
from gaining rents from knowledge received in the future. The other approach builds on the 
possible social aspects of exchange relationships. The lack of willingness to return a favor   6
induces guilt feelings and bad reputation. It is generally agreed that receiving a benefit will 
enhance the probability that the favor will be returned with a similar transmission of knowl-
edge. This depends on the value of the knowledge or information. The higher the benefit, the 
larger the chance that it will be returned. Obviously, even if the receiver is eager to return the 
favor, the initial transmitting firm receives no gain from the relationship, if the receiver is 
unable to provide any beneficial knowledge. Therefore, Carter (1989) suggests that informa-
tion trading firm tends to favor partners, that promise the most useful knowledge in return. 
Clearly, a firm is more interested in establishing relationships with another firm, which is at 
the forefront of technological development. 
In Maskell et al. (1998) the creation of informal networks of contacts go through several 
phases, from relations between two individuals to entire networks. The transformation starts 
with transfer of knowledge between two individuals. Repeated interactions between the two 
lead to falling costs of future interactions by development of routines and conventions, which 
decrease costs. This makes the relationship stable. Both vertically and horizontally related 
firms may benefit from a climate of trust and mutual understanding. This will facilitate more 
informal contacts and interaction both at the level of the firm and the employee (Maskell, 
2001). Maskell also stresses the importance of experimenting and testing different technologi-
cal paths in clusters of horizontally related firms. They learn from the success and failure of 
others and are able to monitor, discuss, and compare other firms’ solutions. Thereby, they 
participate in a continuous learning process by comparing different solutions, selecting, imi-
tating and adding their own ideas. 
Breschi and Lissoni (2001b) are critical of some of these ideas. Building on detailed studies, 
they make two main points (our emphasis). First, knowledge sharing through informal con-
tacts is not likely to involve more than sharing of small ideas, which will not jeopardize the 
originators’ rights to more strategic knowledge. Second, inter-personal communication is 
relatively more important for sharing knowledge with customers than with competitors 
(Lissoni, 2001). Moreover, Schrader (1991) finds that friendships have no significant impact 
on the probability that information is traded. However, he also claims that friendship might 
define the extent of the network. Furthermore, physical proximity does not imply the exis-
tence of social proximity, since such epistemic communities (see Cowan et al. (2000) and 
Steinmueller (2000)) never include all members of the local community. Knowledge may be 
far from accessible to most of those located nearby (Breschi and Lissoni, 2001b). Knowledge 
circulates in small epistemic communities, which are centered around single firms, rather 
than flowing freely within clusters (Lissoni, 2001). 
In analyzing the Brescia mechanical cluster, Lissoni (2001) also finds that the communities 
consist of individual engineers linked by personal ties of trust and reputation. Although they 
arise from successful commercial partnerships and deals, the communities are not based on 
inter-firm arrangements, but respect appropriation strategies of each firm. Accordingly, Bre-
schi and Lissoni (2001b) argue that there might be several competing networks of firms in a 
regional cluster. The networks are built over time with the cooperation of partners, suppliers 
and customers. As a result of long lasting inter-firm cooperation, engineers have created their 
own ‘codebook’ and specific knowledge, which cannot easily be understood by competitors.   7
Even in epistemic communities containing members from competing networks, the engineers 
retain their loyalty towards the firm or the network they belong to. They exchange general 
rather than more specific knowledge. Although regional clusters are seen as homogeneous 
knowledge communities, the firms still tend to be specialized in narrow market niches with 
customized products. As a result, only a fraction of firm specific knowledge can possibly be 
diffused through informal contacts within a cluster (Lissoni 2001).  
In summary, earlier theoretical contributions argue that knowledge is diffused through in-
formal contacts. Across firms, colleagues provide each other with advice and solutions to 
problems. They disclose even firm-specific valuable knowledge with future favors in mind 
despite the fact that it could be a disadvantage to the firm. However, this has been criticized 
recently by other scholars arguing that agents will not disclose firm specific knowledge to 
external agents because of loyalty to the firm. They will only exchange more general knowl-
edge of low value. Based on these conflicting we formulate two groups of propositions in the 
next section. 
3  Building testable propositions 
Based on the above two sections, propositions will be formulated below and tested in sec-
tion five. They are divided into two groups according to the aims of the paper. The first deals 
with the type, extent and value of informal contacts, while the second focuses on their causes. 
We develop the following propositions on the basis of arguments from the advocates of the 
position that informal contacts between employees in different firms is an important source 
of knowledge for the firms, and that these networks will be an important agglomerative 
force. 
3.1  Propositions group 1 
When an engineer decides to share knowledge with an informal contact, he/she should 
ideally consider whether it is in the economic interest of the firm. However, he/she will look 
past that sometimes and disclose important pieces of knowledge even if it is a disadvantage 
for his/her firm. This type of transaction will take place because the engineers will expect to 
get valuable knowledge in return. The higher the benefits at the receiving end of the ex-
change, the larger the chance for reciprocation. 
•  Hypothesis 1a: Firm-specific knowledge is exchanged. 
•  Hypothesis 1b: Knowledge acquired through informal contact is generally valu-
able to receiver. 
In the questionnaire we deal with this by asking the engineer whether he/she acquired 
knowledge through informal contacts that can be used in his/ her own work. Afterwards the 
engineer is asked to value that knowledge (high, medium or low) and to characterize it.   8
3.2  Propositions group 2 
The contacts are informal exchange relationships. They are stable over time, since creation 
of informal contacts takes time to build up and involves trust and frequent interaction. Over 
time employees tend to keep in contact with former colleagues and classmates as they change 
job within a cluster. At first only low value knowledge is traded through a specific informal 
contact because of uncertainty about the relationship. But as the number of successful trans-
actions and trust increases, it is possible that more valuable knowledge can be traded. 
Through a long working experience, an engineer gets in contact with more people and works 
in different project groups, firms etc. He builds up trust and reputation and therefore in-
creases the number of contacts. Perhaps more importantly, he increases his know-who knowl-
edge. This increases the extent of informal contacts and leads to the following hypotheses: 
•  Hypothesis 2a: Relationships between engineers persist through time. 
•  Hypothesis 2b: More knowledge will be shared as the employees gain experi-
ences, because of stronger relationships and increased trust. 
The employer has an incentive to prohibit diffusion of certain types of knowledge through 
informal contacts. In order to minimize the loss of competitive advantage from valuable 
knowledge, the firm wants to limit the possibility of employees disclosing information about 
their businesses. This leads to: 
•  Hypothesis 2c: Firms want to reduce the extent of knowledge sharing with em-
ployees in other firms through informal channels to prevent competitors from 
getting valuable knowledge and secrets. 
These propositions are investigated in section five. We will now briefly introduce the ques-
tionnaire. 
This paper draws on data from a recent questionnaire survey conducted by Michael S. 
Dahl, Bent Dalum, Christian Ø. R. Pedersen and Gert Villumsen (all from the IKE-Group, 
Department of Business Studies, Aalborg University) in November/December 2001. A ques-
tionnaire was sent to the engineers in the NorCOM firms. NorCOM is the name of a formal 
organization formed by some of the firms in the cluster. At present, there are 25 members of 
NorCOM out of the 35+ firms belonging to the cluster. The questionnaire was sent to the 
managers of the 25 NorCOM member firms. 19 of these managers agreed to recommend to 
their employees with engineering degrees (including computer scientists) to answer the ques-
tionnaire. 
The engineers are the single most important resource for research and development in the 
cluster. In almost all of the firms they account for a high proportion of employment. After 
contacting the managers personally, we received information about the number of employees 
in this category. 791 questionnaires were sent to the 19 firms. 346 questionnaires were re-
turned to us, which amounts to a 44 percent response rate. 
After asking for some basic information and educational background, we asked about the 
following: (i) Working experience in communication technology and in different locations,   9
(ii) characteristics of their present job as well as important parameters in their job selection 
process, (iii) reasons for job changes, (iv) contact with other employees from other firms, (v) 
contact with departments and university staff, (vi) the need for, and use of, further educa-
tional opportunities, (vii) the importance of, and reason for, membership/non-membership 
of labor unions, and (viii) the entrepreneurial spirit and opportunities for the establishment 
of firms in the future. 
In this paper and in the questionnaire, we define an informal contact as a person working 
in another firm (in the same cluster) with whom the engineer has a social relationship and 
who is not part of a formalized agreement between the two firms. 
4  NorCOM – the wireless communications cluster in Northern 
Denmark 
The ICT sector in Denmark employed approximately 109,000 persons in 1999, four percent 
of total national employment. The geographic structure of the Danish ICT sector measured 
by relative specialization indices shows a tendency to concentrate around the metropolitan 
areas and especially around two of the largest cities in Denmark, the Copenhagen region and 
Aarhus County. At the municipality level, the fourth largest Danish city Aalborg and sur-
rounding municipalities, also show ICT specialization. Analysis of international specializa-
tion of ICT manufactured goods by the OECD trade statistics reveals that Denmark was spe-
cialized in the manufacture of mobile phones in the period 1990-1998. Denmark shares this 
specialization with Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and, in more recent years, France 
and Germany (Dalum et al., 2001). The Danish export specialization in manufacturing mobile 
phones is mainly concentrated in the Copenhagen region (with large subsidiaries of Nokia 
and Ericsson) and North Jutland (the region of Aalborg).  
During the last two decades a cluster has emerged in North Jutland, which is focused on 
wireless communications equipment. The cluster is defined by a joint knowledge base, which 
includes electronic signals transmitted in the air by radio waves. It consists of approximately 
35 firms with a total employment of 3,900. The total employment constitutes more than 40% 
of ICT employment in the region and approximately 1.6% of total employment.  
4.1  The history 
The history of the communications cluster can be traced back the foundation of SP Radio, a 
consumer electronics firm, in the late 1940s. The firm was founded in Aalborg in 1948 and the 
location factor was primarily personal preferences by the founder (Gelsing and Brændgaard, 
1988; Dalum, 1995). In the mid-1960s the firm made a rather successful shift to production 
and development of professional maritime communications equipment. The region had a 
large fleet of fishing ships and other small vessels. In the following period SP Radio quickly 
became one of the market leaders in the segment for small and medium sized vessels. SP Ra-
dio remained an internationally well-known, technologically leading and competitive firm 
until the 1990s, when the firm went through a very turbulent period.   10
The next landmark in the emergence of the cluster was the foundation of Aalborg Univer-
sity (AAU) in 1974. Several “technical” knowledge institutions had been founded in North 
Jutland in the mid-1960s, but the university was a significant improvement and potentially a 
powerful education and research institution. In the following decades, AAU was one of two 
institutions in Denmark educating five year university candidates (M.Sc.’s) in engineering 
and became a very important factor in the cluster by creating a supply of specialized labor 
and basic research.  
As in the history of other clusters, spinoffs were to play an important part in the emerging 
communications cluster. The first spinoffs came in the early 1970s, when engineers from SP 
Radio started the maritime communications firm, Dancom. In 1977 Simrad (also in maritime 
communication) and in 1980 Dancall (started in maritime communication, but switched early 
to mobile communications) spun off from Dancom. In 1985 Cetelco was formed as an affiliate 
of Simrad, containing its mobile communication activities. Dancall and Cetelco led the 
emerging cluster into a new technological area when they diversified into mobile communi-
cations from the very beginning of the boom of the Nordic Mobile Telephony network 
(NMT) in 1981. AAU played an important part in the diversification process and the subse-
quent strengthening of the mobile communications activities of the cluster by the strong re-
search profile of its electronic engineering department. 
In the late 1980s, a science park (NOVI) was founded in the region, located next to the uni-
versity. The science park had a troubled start with few firms wanting to locate there. None-
theless, for the emerging cluster the science park played an important role from the begin-
ning, both as a knowledge institution and later on as a seed bed for new companies and a 
home for subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies. In 1988, Dancall and Cetelco estab-
lished a pre-competitive joint venture company DC Development, located in NOVI. The aim 
of this joint venture was to develop a phone for the European mobile communications stan-
dard, Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM). When developed, the companies 
would add on their own features and compete. 
The development of GSM as the second generation mobile phone caused significant 
changes in the communication industry in North Jutland. DC Development was a techno-
logical success. Dancall and Cetelco were in 1992 among the first handful of firms in the 
world to introduce a GSM mobile phone, but later they experienced financial problems and 
were acquired by foreign companies, and DC Development was closed down. 
In the beginning of the 1990s, the cluster entered a new phase, with foreign capital and 
presence established by the acquisition of Dancall and Cetelco and the entrance of Maxon 
that acquired T-Com in 1991. The new Maxon affiliate became, like SP Radio and Dancall, an 
important element of the cluster’s growth by generating spin-offs (RTX and Shima), mainly 
because of management disagreement with the parent companies. In 1991 the first private 
Danish phone company Sonofon was established in Aalborg and the cluster activities were 
complemented by a telecom service provider. Sonofon has approximately 950 employees in 
Aalborg and is the second largest provider in Denmark. Furthermore, foreign companies be-  11
gan locating in the cluster, several spin-offs emerged, and employment grew rapidly. There 
was a growing recognition of the communication cluster in this period (Dalum, 1993).  
In the mid 1990s self-reinforcing effects resulted in a rapid increase in the local demand for 
engineers. The cluster grew from a total employment of a couple of hundred in the 1970s to 
1,500 employees in 1995, reaching around 4,000 employees at the turn of the century. New 
spinoffs emerged and some of the most important multinational players in the communica-
tions industry established R&D activities in the region (Ericsson, Nokia, Motorola and Sie-
mens). Foreign firms acquired many companies and several spinoffs were financed by for-
eign capital, supporting the rapid expansion of the cluster and strengthening its image as a 
development hub. But, as a negative effect of the foreign ownership, part of the decision-
making power moved outside the region.  
The recent turbulence in the ICT sector, not least in telecommunications, has affected the 
communications cluster, albeit to a fairly small extent. The trend towards physical separation 
of production and R&D and the lack of local manufacturing has consequently strengthened 
the profile of the cluster as a development hub.  
4.2  Previous studies of informal contacts and other inter-firm relation-
ships 
A survey of links in the electronic industry in North Jutland in 1988 found only a few for-
mal links, but interviews revealed the existence of many informal links (Gelsing and Brænd-
gaard, 1988). This study, the first to map the relations between the firms by spinoffs, also 
found a high degree of mobility between the firms. Based on interviews, Gelsing and Brænd-
gaard concluded that although the management disapproved of informal contacts and exter-
nal knowledge diffusion, there were well developed informal contacts between technical per-
sonnel, who knew each other’s job shifts and stayed in contact. Dalum (1993) confirms this 
through interviews at management level: 
“… the informal personal networks (…) have been of significant impor-
tance. Below the level of top management there are intensive informal 
links between employees, even from firms who are competitors.”(Dalum, 
1993 p. 200) 
With no official cooperation between firms, technical personnel borrowed test equipment 
and spare parts from each other and small technical problems were solved by telephone calls 
to former colleagues or fellow students. The knowledge diffusion had the character of trade 
with expected reciprocity. Gelsing and Brændgaard (1988) claim that the informal contacts 
and subsequent knowledge diffusion was very important for the emergence of the cluster.   12
5  The Importance of Informal Contacts  
The sample of engineers mainly consists of men (94%) with an average age of 33 years. 
Almost half of them are graduates from Aalborg University and their average work experi-
ence in the cluster is between four and five years, 62% have worked in the cluster four years 
or less. On average they have worked a little more than 2½ years in their current job and less 
than 25% have done so for more than three years. Their current function in the firms is de-
scribed in figure 1. They are primarily engaged in research and development functions. 
 
The important issue for this paper is whether the engineers are part of informal personal 
networks. The majority (76%) answer that they have at least one informal contact with em-
ployees in other firms in the cluster. Informal contacts are, as expected, a widespread phe-
nomenon, which is shown in the top of table 1.  
5.1  Value and specificity – Testing Propositions group 1 
Do the engineers acquire any useful knowledge through informal contacts with persons in 
other firms? To investigate this, we look at the acquisition of knowledge in general and with 
respect to their job function. We divide the engineers into two groups, those who acquire and 
those who do not acquire any knowledge through informal contact that they can use in the 
current job. This is shown in the bottom of table 1.   13
Table 1: Engineers with at least one informal contact and their acquisition of knowledge. 
Question N  Yes  No  Total 
“Do you have informal contact with at least one em-
ployee in another firm in the cluster?”  342
1 76% 24%  100% 
“Do you acquire knowledge through your informal con-
tact(s) that you take advantage of in your current job?”  258
2 41% 59%  100% 
1. This is equal to the total sample excluding four missing observations. Percentages are shares of this number. 
2. This is the number of respondents with at least one informal contact. 
Out of the engineers with informal contacts 41% gain knowledge from them. This means 
that the informal contacts do act as a channel of knowledge, since 30% of the total sample get 
knowledge from their contacts that they find to be useful in their own job. In comparison, 
Schrader (1991) surveys technical managers in the steel mill industry and finds that 83% of 
his sample had provided specific technical information to a colleague in another firm at least 
once during the last year. Schrader’s study is however of the entire US steel mill industry, 
which is not geographically clustered, but his results suggest that these informal relation-
ships across firms are important even across significant geographical distances. In a study of 
electronic and mechanical engineers working within four industries in the Brescia mechanical 
cluster, Lissoni (2001) finds that 30% of the engineers have a relationship of some kind with 
engineers in other firms. 60% of these relationships involve technical discussions, which is 
equivalent to 18% of the total sample. This is clearly conflicting with our results, but may be 
due to differences in the two samples. The present study is of a small cluster located in a 
small geographical area, the Aalborg region, with a fairly limited amount of firms with one 
common core technology, wireless communication. In contrast, Lissoni’s study has a broader 
industrial specification and firms are located throughout larger geographical area. This could 
be the reason why we find higher shares of engineers with informal contacts and knowledge 
sharing. 
However, we still know little about what kinds of knowledge are shared through these 
contacts. The critical literature claims that this knowledge will be general and not very spe-
cific. Indeed, Lissoni (2001) finds that 27% of the engineers’ relationships involve only ask-
ing/giving generic suggestions and only 15% had discussion of current projects. His results 
show a lower level of information trading, from which he concludes that informal contacts do 
not go beyond the exchange of generic information. But, again, his study is broader as dis-
cussed above. Figure 2 shows how many engineers acquire different kinds of knowledge in 
our study.   14
 
Note: The engineers were asked the following question: “Which type of knowledge do you acquire through your 
informal contact(s)?” and were given four options: general knowledge, technical knowledge on standard equipment, 
technical knowledge on new products, and other. The percentages reported are the total number of engineers, who 
acquire the particular type of knowledge, as a share of the total number of engineers who answered that he/she 
acquired knowledge from his/her contacts (104 respondents). The respondents can pick more than one type of 
knowledge in the questionnaire. 
 
Engineers acquire all kinds of knowledge through their informal contacts. General knowl-
edge is indeed diffused through this channel with more than 80% answering this. However, 
also more specific knowledge is diffused as more than 30% of engineers who acquire knowl-
edge have gained access to technical knowledge on new products. In the bigger picture, this 
shows that 32% of the engineers with at least one informal contact get access to general 
knowledge from this contact. More interestingly 12% of these engineers also acquire more 
specific knowledge on new products. Clearly this means that informal contacts in other local 
firms cannot be neglected as being a channel of specific knowledge. This confirms hypothesis 
1a. In this context it is interesting to see not only what type of knowledge is acquired, but also 
how this knowledge is of value to the receiving engineer.   15
 
Note: The engineers were asked the following question: “How do you rate the value of the knowledge that you re-
ceive from your informal contact?” and were given three options, high-, medium-, and low value. 
 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the value of knowledge across the three categories. 
More than 60% of the respondents that gain access to knowledge rate this to be of medium or 
high value to their own work. All in all these respondents are equal to almost 20% of the total 
sample. This gives a clear indication that the informal contacts are important sources of 
knowledge and that a significant share of engineers greatly benefits from these contacts in 
relation to his/her own work. This confirms hypothesis 1b. Similarly, 61% of Schrader’s 
(1991) sample finds consider colleagues in other firms an important to very important infor-
mation source and only colleagues in own firm was considered to be more important. 
5.2  The genesis of informal contacts – Testing propositions group 2 
Table 2 shows whom the engineers are in contact with. More than half of the engineers in 
the sample have informal contact with former colleagues in the cluster. This indicates that 
mobility is important for the extension of informal contact networks. The relationships cre-
ated by engineers working together seem to last longer than for the time they are working 
together. The second largest category is former classmates. The results confirm hypothesis 2a, 
since the relationships created over time are persistent.   16
Table 2: Who are engineers in contact with?1 
Category 
Share of all engineers with at least 
one informal contact (N=259) 
Share of entire 
 sample (N=346) 
Former colleagues  66%  49% 
Classmates 50%  38% 
Private friends  47%  36% 
Others 8%  6% 
1. The engineers were asked the following question: “Who are you in informal contact with?” They could pick more 
than one answer to this question. 
Note: Chi-square test for share of engineers having contact with different categories reveals that the results are sig-
nificant at a 1%-level.  
To investigate further the role of mobility in the creation of informal contacts, we examine 
whether higher mobility will result in a higher probability of having at least one informal 
contact. There is no difference in the frequency of informal contact between the engineers 
with higher or lower than average mobility between firms. This is shown in table 3. The re-
sults are insignificant. Although the engineers keep in contact with former colleagues it is 
clear that above-average mobility does not increase the probability that they have at least one 
informal contact. Changing jobs does contribute with informal contacts to 66% of the engi-
neers, but it does not increase the number of people with contacts. This indicates that a cer-
tain share of the respondents are not interested in or for other reasons reluctant to have in-
formal relationships with people outside their own firm even though they worked with them 
in the past. Note, however that 16% of our sample have only recently entered the labor mar-
ket (within the last two years) and are still working in their first job. They may be less likely 
to have developed informal contact with employees in other firms, as the probability of hav-
ing at least one contact might increase with experience. This is investigated in table 4. 
Table 3: Mobility and informal contact. 
N=327 




Above average number of total job 
changes in career (high mobility)  78%  21%  100% 
Below average number of total job 
changes in career (low mobility)  75%  25%  100% 
Total 76%  24%  100% 
Note: Chi-square test reveals that the table is not significant, i.e. there is no significant difference between high and 
low mobility. 
The results for industry and cluster experience are very similar. Engineers with longer 
working experience are more likely to have at least one informal contact. This is not surpris-
ing, since the longer time they have worked in the cluster or in the industry the more confer-
ences they have been at and the more different firms they have worked in. All of which in-
creases their probability of having at least one contact. On the other hand, the engineers with 
low experience have worked in fewer firms and met less people, which give them a smaller 
probability. The share of more experienced engineers, who value the knowledge as high or 
average, is also larger than the less experienced. However, we cannot confirm that the engi-
neers with more experience are more likely to acquire knowledge than less experienced, but   17
the knowledge they get certainly has a higher average value to them. This indicates that the 
greater experience the engineers have the better they are at acquiring useful knowledge from 
their contact. They know who they have to contact to get the knowledge or help to solve their 
problem. This enables us only partly to confirm hypothesis 2b. 
Table 4: Experiences and acquisition of knowledge. 
 
















1        
2 years or less   68%  32%  37%  63%  50%  50% 
3  years  or  more  82% 18% 43% 57% 71% 29% 
Industry experience
2        
3 years or less   69%  31%  38%  62%  52%  48% 
4  years  or  more    82% 18% 43% 57% 72% 28% 
1. Chi-square test reveals that the table is significant at a 1%-level (informal vs. no informal, N=342), is not significant 
(acquire vs. not acquire, N=258) and significant at a 5%-level (high vs. low, N=104). 
2. Chi-square test reveals that the table is significant at a 1%-level (informal vs. no informal, N=342), is not significant 
(acquire vs. not acquire, N=258) and significant at a 5%-level (high vs. low, N=104). 
Note: Generally, these chi-square test shows that there are significant differences between low and high experience 
for informal vs. no informal contacts and for high vs. low value, but the differences are insignificant for acquire vs. 
not acquire. 
Having at least one informal contact could also depend on the function the engineers pri-
marily hold in the firms. Table 5 shows the job functions of the sample. Engineers who pri-
marily work with management issues are most likely to have at least one informal contact, 
although the share for the respondents working with R&D is not much lower. Production has 
a much lower share. More interestingly, the table also shows that management and produc-
tion engineers have higher levels of knowledge acquisition compared with R&D engineers. 
Table 5: Function in firm and informal contacts? 
 







Do not acquire 
knowledge 
Research and Development  76% 24% 36% 64% 
Production  53% 47% 56% 44% 
Management  81% 19% 55% 45% 
Total  76% 24% 40% 60% 
Note: Marketing engineers have been removed from this table due to too few observations. Chi-square tests reveal 
that the table is significant at a 6%-level for both informal vs. no informal (N=329) and acquire vs. not acquire 
(N=248). This shows that there are significant differences across job functions. 
Not only do more managers have at least one informal contact, more of them also acquire 
knowledge from the contact(s) compared with R&D personnel. Managers are like to have 
worked their way up the occupational latter and perhaps started working as R&D engineers 
themselves in the beginning of their career. Consequently, they have more experience than 
the rest of the sample; they have met more people from other firms and know were to find 
the knowledge they need. Furthermore, their job as managers will perhaps also mean that 
they attend more conferences and other arrangements, where they might meet employees   18
from other firms. All this will increase their probabilities of having at least one contact and 
that they share knowledge. Schrader (1991) found percentages similar to these in his study, 
which only included technical managers.  
Besides arising from mobility and other of the above factors, the initial contact between 
engineers from two firms could be created by a joint formalized project. If they work together 
on a limited joint project, there is a possibility that their relationships will last longer than the 
project itself. Engineers previously involved in formalized projects with employees from 
other firms in the cluster were also more likely to have informal contact than engineers not 
previously involved, as shown in table 6. It is plausible that some of the informal contacts 
arise directly from prior formalized projects. Working in a firm that previously has been in a 
formalized project with another local firm increases the probability that the employees have 
at least one informal contact outside his/her firm. 
Table 6: Formal projects1 in the past and informal contact. 
N=342 




Formal projects  87%  13%  100% 
No formal projects  73%  27%  100% 
Total 76%  24%  100% 
1. We define a formal project as a cooperative agreement between two or more firms. 
Note: Chi-square test reveals that the table is significant at a 2%-level, which shows that formal projects are signifi-
cantly different from no formal projects. 
As proposed by Von Hippel (1987) and Schrader (1991), firms might discourage or even 
actively trying to prevent their knowledge from being shared with an outside party by their 
employees. Skarsø’s (1998) interviews with managers indicated that this is the case in this 
particular cluster. The management culture in the firms might thus have influence on how 
and to which extent the employees share their knowledge with others. As mentioned earlier 
firms in this cluster became increasingly interesting objects of acquisition for multinational 
corporations (MNCs) throughout the 1990s. A interview-based study by Lorenzen and Mah-
nke (2002) reveals that the management culture of the MNCs have influenced the social net-
works of the acquired firms. After the acquisition, local networking is discouraged and net-
working within the organization of the MNC is encouraged. Clearly managerial regimes and 
culture can have an effect on the extent of informal relationships across the boundaries of 
firm and corporations. 
It is publicly known that some of the engineers have competition clauses or non-compete 
covenants of various contents included in their employment contracts. These clauses can, for 
instance, limit the employee’s possibilities to take a job in a competing firm or work with the 
same products immediately after breaking the contract. In our sample 16.2% of the engineers 
have a competition clause in their contract. We use these clauses as proxy for a firm’s actions 
towards limiting the disclosure of knowledge to other firms through informal channels. We 
argue that firms, who include these clauses in the contracts of their employees, are also more 
likely to have policies preventing or discouraging their employees from sharing the firm’s   19
knowledge with an informal contact. Table 7 shows the influence of competition clauses and 
the probability of having at least one informal contact. 
Table 7: Competition clauses and informal contacts. 
N=338  At least one informal contact  No informal contacts 
Competition clause   63%  37% 
No competition clause  79%  21% 
Note: Chi-square test reveals that the table is significant at a 2%-level. Thus, there is significant differences between 
competition clause and no competition clause. 
We find that the engineers, who have competition clauses in their contracts, are less likely 
to have at least one informal contact outside the firm. Only 63% of the respondents with a 
clause like this have one or more informal contacts. This shows that firms with restrictive 
managerial regimes, i.e. with competition clauses in the contracts, are successfully limiting 
informal networking between their employee and employees in other cluster firms. This 
supports hypothesis 2c, since firms are trying to limit the contact between their employees 
and other firms. 
Previously in this chapter, we presented evidence that general knowledge is the type of 
knowledge, which is shared the most through the networks in this cluster. Notifications 
about new job openings etc. is frequently mention in the literature as a more general type of 
knowledge. Below we find some evidence for this point by looking at how the engineers 
primarily received information about their current job in relation to their participation in in-
formal contact with engineers from other firms. The primary channels for information about 
current jobs were divided into network related factors, non-network related factors, as shown 
in table 8. 
Table 8: Network and non-network primary channels for information about current job. 
N=277  Informal contacts  No informal contacts 
Non-network related factors
1 69%  31% 
Network related factors
2 82%  18% 
1. Non-network related factors: Internet job databases, job ads, the press, etc. 
2. Network related factors: Former colleagues, classmates, employees in the new firm, etc. 
Note: Chi-square test reveals that the table is significant at a 1%-level. Non-network and network related factors are 
significantly different. 
Engineers with a least one informal contact made more use of network related factors as 
their primary channel for information when changing to their current job. This shows that the 
respondents with informal contact(s) to a larger extent use other channels to access knowl-
edge about more general issues as e.g. new job openings. This is an example of the general 
knowledge, which flows through the informal networks of contacts between employees and 
between firms in the cluster.   20
6  Conclusion 
This paper describes how the theoretical contributions arguing that knowledge is diffused 
through informal contacts have been criticized recently by scholars stating that agents will 
not disclose firm specific knowledge to external agents, because of loyalty to the firm. They 
argue that employees will only exchange more general knowledge of low value, which will 
not have disadvantages for their firms. However, we show in this paper that more specific 
knowledge is diffused. Even specific knowledge on new products, which is likely to be very 
firm specific and which the firms are likely to want to protect from competitors. A large share 
of the engineers questioned received knowledge from their informal contact, which they 
value to be of high/medium importance for their own work. This tells us that the informal 
contacts are an importance source of knowledge for the engineer in this cluster. 
Besides exchanging knowledge about their products and technologies, the engineers might 
discuss more cluster-specific information and knowledge. Rumors about individuals or 
firms, future job openings and other information and knowledge like this are also likely to be 
part of the informal relationship. This channel is also likely to be used as a way to establish 
the reputation of the individual in the local environment. With a good reputation the engi-
neer might be a valuable partner in future, more formal, co-operation between the firms, or 
as a future employee in the other firm. 
Labor market policies can have vital influences on the extent of informal contacts and local 
communication between firms. As our results showed, competition clauses (or non-compete 
covenants) in the engineers’ contracts limit external communication of the engineers. This can 
influence the development of a cluster and industry in general. Not only can these clauses 
affect informal networking, but restrictive legislation on what firms can demand in the 
clauses can have strong effects on the possibilities for an engineer to start a new firm. This 
can limit the evolution of clusters and hinder employment growth. This is shown by Stuart 
and Sorensen (2002) finding that the strength of enforceability in employees non-compete 
covenants strongly moderates the founding rates of new biotechnology firms in US states. 
Other studies (e.g. Silicon Valley (Brittain and Freeman, 1986) and the US automobile indus-
try (Klepper, 2002)) have shown that clusters are often driven by spinoffs accounting for 
growth in employment and the number of firms. Restrictive policies towards the clauses 
could have positive effects on local and national economic development (cf. Klepper, 2001; 
Stuart and Sorenson, 2001; 2002).  
Informal networks can play an important role for local development and the emergence of 
clusters. When an entrepreneur establishes his/her own firm, the location is very likely to be 
within a close distance to his/her previous employment. The entrepreneur keeps his local 
contacts, when the firm is established and he/she is already familiar with the local environ-
ment, which will improve the probability that the entrepreneur will succeed. This can be an 
important explanation for the emergence of the NorCOM cluster. An attractive labor market 
also is more likely to be the one of main factors behind the evolution of clusters in general 
and NorCOM in particular. Despite high demand and consequently a higher average wage 
for engineers in NorCOM, MNCs established a presence in the region in the 1990s to access   21
the local labor market. We believe that these two factors explain the emergence and evolution 
of clusters to a wide extent. 
This paper gives insights on the existence and value of informal relationships to the indi-
vidual employee. However, little is still known about the value to the firm and the effects of 
these relationships on firm performance. Future surveys linking the inter-firm informal con-
tacts with firm performance will hold interesting evidence on how firms are influenced both 
positively and negatively by the exchange of their employees. 
Furthermore, it would be fruitful to know more about how the individual are linked in 
networks of informal relationship across firms. Identifying how networks and epistemic 
communities exist in different sectors and regional levels could help measure how widely 
knowledge is exchanged through a network. 
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